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11. INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, reforms that may increase economic eﬃciency aﬀect the in-
terests of those who beneﬁt from the status quo. Special interest groups are bound to
ﬁght any reform that reduces their rents. Even when economic reforms are beneﬁcial
in the aggregate, “...There may still be a distributional struggle... arising from the
possibility that the eventual beneﬁts... will be distributed unevenly (as when stabi-
lization is achieved by imposing a disproportionate tax burden on certain groups).”3
Winners must be unwilling or unable to compensate losers. Why?
In a recent paper Besley and Coate wrote, “...if a potentially Pareto improving
public investment is not undertaken then it must be because the resulting second
period equilibrium choices would have made some citizens worse oﬀ... making future
policy choices through the democratic process constrains society to the interior of the
set of technologically feasible utility allocations...” Citing possible criticisms to their
model they, “...include a Coasian-style challenge to... (the) analysis, which argues
that bargaining between citizens and policy makers should be able to eliminate the
ineﬃciency... the kind of bargain needed to restore eﬃcient policy would require a
signiﬁcant amount of commitment...”4
The intuitive assertion referred to as the Coase Theorem states that as long as
property rights are well deﬁned, the absence of transaction costs would produce eﬃ-
cient outcomes, the distribution of the property rights notwithstanding. In this spirit
3Rodrik 1993, 357.
4Besley and Coate 1998, 152.
2Eggertson writes:
“The economic growth and development of a country are basically un-
aﬀected by the type of government it has, if the cost of transacting in
both the political and economic spheres is zero. However, when transac-
tion costs are positive, the distribution of political power within a country
and the institutional structure of its rule-making institutions are critical
factors in economic development....”5
Do low transaction costs and binding agreements suﬃce to achieve eﬃcient out-
comes? Cooperative games are an ideal zero transaction cost environment; players
can sign arbitrary binding agreements. The common solution concept, the core of a
game, is the set of allocations that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of play-
ers. If games have non-empty cores, the Coase Theorem is compatible with agents
agreeing on a core allocation. As Aivazian and Callen pointed out, however, when
games have empty cores it is unclear what is to be expected. No feasible allocation
exists that cannot be improved upon by some coalition of players. Does it mean that
negotiation continues indeﬁnitely?
Alternative solution concepts exist like the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the bar-
gaining set and others. The Shapley value and the nucleolus are well deﬁned for
arbitrary games but are eﬃcient. By deﬁnition, the grand coalition forms. The bar-
gaining sets assume a coalition structure and then ﬁnd payoﬀs that are compatible
5Eggertson 1990, 248.
3with it. What these solution concepts have in common is that the coalition structure
is exogenous to the play of the game.
Though it casts suspicion on the intuition of eﬃcient bargaining, the cooperative
approach appears to be limited by the inherent eﬃciency of its solution concepts.
A diﬀerent approach, pioneered by Cross, Albers and Bennett, assumes no initial
coalition structure. Coalitions are chosen through the play of the game. The solution
concepts are grouped as the Aspiration Solution Concepts. There is no a priori
requirement of eﬃciency so it is meaningful to ask if the equilibria are eﬃcient and
under what conditions.
Economic reform is the result of bargaining between interest groups and the gov-
ernment. If zero transaction cost are not suﬃcient, what, if anything, would be a
suﬃcient condition for bargaining to produce eﬃcient outcomes?
I ﬁnd that allowing coalition formation, via the aspiration solution concepts of
cooperative games, games with non-empty cores only admit eﬃcient equilibrium out-
comes which are all in the core. The games with empty cores are those in which
there is at least one ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome predicted. In those outcomes, a
coalition of interest groups, typically smaller than the coalition of the whole, forms
and is able to maintain the ineﬃcient status quo institutions. This shows a possible
way out of the conundrum of games with empty cores, while maintaining the nice
core intuition when the core is non-empty.
This line of research bridges policy and theoretical issues and thus appeals to
4two diﬀerent literatures. It deals with issues of policy and institutional change in
countries where interest groups have considerable political power and can therefore
derail proposed reforms. From the theoretical point of view, it is an application of the
theory of cooperative games and coalition formation when players collectively choose
from a set of available options.
The plan of action is to introduce the general environment, results for an arbi-
trary number of players (section 3), the special case with three players (section 4)
and a speciﬁc formulation of the model based in Aumann and Kurz’s “Power and
Taxes” paper (section 5). Readers interested in the proofs and some known results
in cooperative game theory are referred to the appendixes.
2. THE MODEL
The relevant economic agents in this setup are a set of interest groups. Each agent is
an interest group with access to resources it can use to inﬂuence policy or institutional
reform.
The set of players is denoted by N = {1,...,n}. Each player is characterized by
an endowment and a disposable endowment. The endowment represents the resources
that each interest group (or coalitions of them) holds and can inﬂuence policy with.
Definition 1 An endowment proﬁle is a function ω : 2N → R+ satisfying
ω(∅) = 0 and ω(N) > 0. The set of all endowment proﬁles ω : 2N → R+ is Ω.
5I assume that for any T, S ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅; ω satisﬁes:
ω(T ∪ S) ≥ ω(T) + ω(S).
Each endowment proﬁle is the result of the underlying economic structure. For
example, a monopolistic market will lead to an endowment proﬁle diﬀerent from that
of a perfectly competitive market. I assume there are only two proﬁles, ω0 for the
status quo and ω1 for the economy under the policy reform.
Definition 2 Given a proﬁle ω0, a proﬁle ω1 is superior to ω0 when ω1(N) > ω0(N).
This relation is denoted as ω1 ⊲ ω0.
For each endowment proﬁle the players are entitled to a share of ω(N).





The disposable endowment rule is a stylized description of tax laws, subsidies
and other transfers, and their eﬀect on the disposable endowment - the disposable
income - of each player. The model captures the impact of a change in the underlying
economic institutions by their eﬀect on interest groups’ disposable endowments.
The selection between the status quo ω0 or the new ω1 is done by weighted majority
voting. The endowment proﬁle measures the voting rights that each interest group
(or coalitions of them) has. The endowment ω(S) is the share of votes of coalition S.
A voting majority in the model is parameterized by   ∈ (1
2,1). Given   ∈ (1
2,1), a
coalition S with ω0(S) ≥     ω0(N) is called a  -winning coalition.
6The bargaining position (or reservation price) of each coalition is the minimum
payoﬀ it can guarantee for itself even if the rest of the players vote against it. In
general cooperative game theory this payoﬀs are represented by functions v : 2N → Rn
that vanish on the empty set. The number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S;
N is called the grand coalition. From now on I will refer to an arbitrary cooperative
game as v, while the cooperative game resulting from the environment of interest
groups and policy choices as g. The following deﬁnes the game g parameterized by
ω0,ω1,ψ and  .
Definition 4 Given a triplet (ω0,ω1,ψ) and   ∈ (1
2,1) the cooperative game g :
2N → R+ is deﬁned by
g(S) =

   














ψi(ω1)} if ω0(S) <     ω0(N).
(1)
The game g is superadditive.6 An outcome for this game is a vector of payoﬀs and
a partition of N containing a winning coalition. The winning coalition pins down the
policy choice.
Common solution concepts like the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus,
have outcomes that are eﬃcient by deﬁnition: the equilibrium payoﬀs of the players
add up to the worth of the grand coalition.7 In games with empty cores why should
the grand coalition form?
It is necessary, then, to consider solution concepts allowing arbitrary partitions of
6See Appendix.
7The axiomatization of the core does not include eﬃciency but assumes the core is non-empty.
7N in the outcome, determined endogenously in the play of the game. The aspiration
solution concepts are a class of solution concepts with endogenous coalition formation.
An aspiration is a vector of prices demanded by the players that satisﬁes some
desirable conditions. Each player will formulate a price that they will ask for in order
to be a part of a coalition.8
Definition 5 An aspiration for a game v : 2N → R is a vector x ∈ Rn such that
1. ∀S ⊆ N,
 
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S). (No Surplus)
2. ∀i ∈ N, ∃S with i ∈ S such that
 
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S). (Feasibility)
The set of aspirations of a game v is denoted by Asp(v) .
The “no surplus” condition of aspirations is practically identical to the deﬁnition
of the core. The diﬀerence between the concepts is that an aspiration is not required
to be feasible for all coalitions, in particular not for the grand coalition. However, the
feasibility condition guarantees the players will never select prices so high no other
player will form a coalition with them. The focus is on coalitions that can support
the aspirations.








The feasibility condition implies the generating collection of an aspiration is a
covering of the set of players: ∪S∈GC(x)S = N.
8I follow the deﬁnitions of Bennett, 1983.
8The intuitive idea behind aspirations is that the players will select their prices
before any coalition is formed. Once a set of prices is determined, some of the feasible
coalitions will form. Rather than starting with a coalition structure and ﬁnding robust
sets of payoﬀs for deviations in that coalition structure, aspiration solution concepts
ﬁnd price vectors that are ﬁxed regardless of which coalitions end up forming.
The bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler9 has the property that only objec-
tions (threats to disrupt coalitions) that cannot be counter objected are relevant. The
Aspiration Bargaining Set proposed by Albers and Bennett has the intuitively ap-
pealing properties of the aspiration solution concepts but it preserves the bargaining
set idea.10
The aspiration bargaining set chooses speciﬁc aspirations from Asp(v). In particu-
lar it chooses aspirations in which no player needs or depends on another player to get
their price. If that were the case, the player who is needed presumably would increase
their price making that aspiration “unstable.” Let GCi(x) = {S ∈ GC(x)|i ∈ S}.
Then i is vulnerable to j at x if GCi(x)   GCj(x).
Definition 7 The Aspiration Bargaining Set (ABS(v)) is the set of aspirations x
in which no player is vulnerable.
Since no player is vulnerable in an aspiration in ABS(v), any objection can be
met by a counter-objection preserving the bargaining set intuition. Bennett showed
9Aumann and Maschler, 1997.
10Bennett, ibid.
9the ABS is nonempty for all games with side-payments.11
What types of equilibrium outcomes does the ABS predict? To ﬁx ideas, consider
the set of all  -winning coalitions W = {S ∈ 2N|ω(S) ≥     ω(N)}. An equilibrium
outcome partition of players will be of the form with S being a (winning) coalition in
W ∩ GC(x) for some x ∈ ABS(g). The players in the winning coalition receive their
aspiration while the players left out have to do with the disposable endowment they
get under the majority’s decision.
Definition 8 An equilibrium outcome for g is a vector of payoﬀs π ∈ Rn
+ and a
partition P = {S,{j}j/ ∈S} of the set of players if there exists x ∈ ABS(g) such that
πi =

         
         














ψi(ω1), i / ∈ S
where S ∈ W ∩ GC(x).
All equilibria contain a unique winning coalition.
Definition 9 The outcome (π,P) is eﬃcient if
 
i∈N πi = g(N), it is ineﬃcient
when
 
i∈N πi < g(N).
Note that this deﬁnition of eﬃciency is weaker than the standard Pareto eﬃ-
ciency in that it only considers the aggregate and not the way in which the output is
distributed.
For the winning coalition, the equilibrium outcomes are always (coalitionally) eﬃ-
11Bennett, 1983; Bennet and Zame, 1988.
10cient, this is not necessarily so for the whole economy. The next section characterizes
the set g of equilibria that have eﬃcient equilibrium outcomes.
2.1. Eﬃciency and the Emptiness of the Core
In this section the class of games g that admit ineﬃcient results is characterized for
arbitrary n. The special case of three player games is considered in the next section.
Theorem 1 Under the ABS solution, if a game g with n players has an empty core
then it has at least one ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See Appendix.
Is the converse true? For arbitrary cooperative games v with side payments it is
not. Moldovanu (1997) describes a two sided game with a non-empty core in which
a point in the ABS is not in the core. It is unclear to me if the converse is true for
the type of games (g) generated by the policy choice model.
An alternative claim can be made, though, that if besides being partnered, the
chosen aspirations are minimal. That is, they are the smallest sum vectors that satisfy
no surplus, feasibility and the partnering condition. It has been shown that the set
of minimal aspirations is nonempty and coincides with the core when the core itself
is non-empty.12
The set of minimal aspirations is called the Aspiration Core (AC) or the set of
balanced aspirations. Bennett shows that the AC and the ABS have a nonempty
intersection for arbitrary games. The intersection is called the Partnered Aspiration
12See Appendix.
11Core or the set of minimal partnered aspirations.
Note that since the Partnered Aspiration Core is a subset of the core when it is
non-empty, all the equilibrium outcomes of games with nonempty cores are eﬃcient.
Theorem 2 If the solution concept is the Partnered Aspiration Core, all the equilibria
of a game g with n players are eﬃcient if and only if the core of g is nonempty.
Proof: See Appendix.
2.2. A Game with Three Players
The games with n = 3 are a special and illustrative case. Compared with games with
n > 3, three players games do not require the minimality condition on aspirations to
prove the equivalent of Theorem 2. Also, not only is ABS(g) ⊆ Core(g) but it is in
fact equal to the relative interior of the core of g.13 Results and examples follow.
The ﬁrst result shows that, if there are three players and the game has an empty
core then there can be at most three outcomes, one of which is ineﬃcient.
Proposition 1 For three player games g with an empty core there is a unique aspi-
ration x in ABS(g) with
GC(x) = {(12),(13),(23)}.
There are at most three equilibrium outcomes, and at least one of them is ineﬃcient.
Proof: See Appendix.
Example 1
13For deﬁnitions please see the Appendix.
12Consider a game with three players such that any two players are a  -winning coali-
tion. Their disposable endowments are given by ψ(ω0) = (2,2,2) and ψ(ω1) =
(1,1,5).
The associated cooperative game, with an empty core, is
g(1) = 1 g(12) = 4
g(2) = 1 g(13) = 6
g(3) = 2 g(23) = 6 g(123) = 7.
Some aspirations for the game are
Prices Generating Collections
A (4,4,2) GC(4,4,2) = {(3),(13),(23)}
B (3,1,5) GC(3,1,5) = {(2),(12),(23)}
C (2,2,4) GC(2,2,4) = {(12),(13),(23)}
Note that in aspiration A players 1 and 2 are vulnerable to 3. In B it is players
1 and 3 that are vulnerable to 2. Player 2 has an outside option to obtain its price
while players 1 and 2 have none. In aspiration C, however, all players are partners,
all of them have outside options with respect to both of their opponents. The third is
a partnered aspiration, in fact the only one for this game. The associated equilibrium
outcomes are
13Payoffs Partitions
π = (2,2,2) P = {(12),(3)} (Ineﬃcient)
ˆ π = (1,2,4) ˆ P = {(1),(23)} (Eﬃcient)
¯ π = (2,1,4) ¯ P = {(13),(2)} (Eﬃcient)
Proposition 2 Under the ABS solution, if n = 3, all the equilibria of the game g
are eﬃcient if and only if the core of g is non-empty.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that if the core of a game is empty then all
aspirations in ABS will have a generating collection {(12),(13),(23)} because of the
no vulnerability condition. This is a balanced collection of coalitions which means
(as shown by Bennett, see Appendix B) that the aspiration supporting it is minimal.
For games with more than three players that implication is not obvious.
The minimum no blocking payoﬀ (¯ v) of a game v is the minimal aggregate payoﬀ
necessary to satisfy x(S) ≥ v(S) for all proper coalitions S of N.
Proposition 3 Let n = 3 and C(v)  = ∅. If ¯ v < v(N) then ABS(v) = ri∗C(v) and
all x ∈ ABS(v) have GC(x) = N.
Proof: See Appendix.
Example 2
Let the  -winning coalitions be (12), (13) and (123) and the disposable endowments
ψ(ω0) = (3,1,2) and ψ(ω1) = (1,2,5). The game g is
14g(1) = 1 g(12) = 4 g(123) = 8
g(2) = 1 g(13) = 6
g(3) = 2 g(23) = 3 ¯ g = 7.
The core and ABS are the sets
C(g) = { x ∈ R
3
+|x2 ≥ 1,x3 ≥ 2,x1 + x2 ≥ 4,
x1 + x3 ≥ 6,x2 + x3 ≥ 3,x1 + x2 + x3 = 8 }.
ABS(g) = { x ∈ R
3
+|x2 > 1,x3 > 2,x1 + x2 > 4,
x1 + x3 > 6,x2 + x3 > 3,x1 + x2 + x3 = 8 }.
Proposition 2.3 gives the ABS as the relative interior of the core of g as displayed
in the diagram. The edges of the core are aspirations that do not satisfy the no
vulnerability condition so they are not in ABS. For example a core point with
x1 + x3 = 6 and x1 + x2 +x3 = 8 will have a generating collection {(13),(123)} is an
aspiration where player 2 is vulnerable to 1 and 3 so it is rejected by the aspiration
bargaining set.
2.3. A Disposable Endowment Rule
A disposable endowment rule with nice features is one that preserves the characteristic
of favoring winning coalitions. Such a rule is inspired by the Aumann and Kurz 1977
paper, which emphasized the following two properties:
1. “The political procedure is majority rule. This means that any coalition con-











in any way it pleases.”
2. “...every agent can, if he wishes, destroy all of his endowment...it gives the
minority very considerable threat power...”14
To construct an disposable endowment rule with such characteristics the following
deﬁnition and assumption are needed.
Definition 10 Given ω ∈ Ω a distribution game is a function τω : 2N → R+ such
that τω(∅) = 0 and
τω(N) = ω(N)











if ω(S) ≥ η   ω(N)
(1 − d)ω(S) if ω(S) < η   ω(N)
(2)
14Aumann and Kurz 1977, 1138-1140.
16for all S  = ∅ and where d, c ∈ [0,1] and η ∈ (1
2,1).
The diﬀerence with Aumann and Kurz’s original formulation is the use of weighted
majority voting instead of simple majority. Coalitions endowed with a majority share
of the aggregate endowment can conﬁscate a fraction d of everybody else’s endowment.
The minority can only retaliate by destroying a fraction c of their endowment which
cannot be conﬁscated.15
One can think of statements, of the form: “If coalition S (with me in it) forms we
would have enough power to take a proportion d of your endowment”, as the basis
for Assumption 2.1. Other players make similar statements and also point out that
some (or all) players belong to minority coalitions (those with ω(S) < η   ω(N)).
I have taken the risk of taxing the reader with too much notation, to explicitly
diﬀerentiate the “game” τω from g in the previous section. The function τω is a
mere tool to derive a disposable endowment rule that, in the same way as the policy
choice game g, considers endowments as a proxy for political inﬂuence. The majority
parameter η is not the same as   for the same reason.
The ﬁnal distribution of endowments takes into account everyone’s relative posi-
tion: it is the Shapley value of the game τ. It has the advantage of being well deﬁned,
unique and eﬃcient in the sense that the sum of each agent’s payoﬀ is the payoﬀ of
the grand coalition.16
15The game is based on a similar one proposed in Vega-Redondo 1990 and 1993.
16The Shapley value is deﬁned in the Appendix.
17Assumption 2 The income distribution rule ψ( ) is deﬁned as the vector of Shapley
values of the distribution game τω.
The disposable endowment rule assigns an amount to each interest group non-
decreasing in their endowment although not in a continuous manner. The model is
illustrated by an example.
Example 3
Let n = 3,   = .50001, η = .50001, d = 0.5 and c = 0. The endowment proﬁles are
ω0(1) = 2 ω0(12) = 4 ω1(1) = 2 ω1(12) = 4
ω0(2) = 2 ω0(13) = 4 ω1(2) = 2 ω1(13) = 7
ω0(3) = 2 ω0(23) = 4 ω0(123) = 6 ω1(3) = 5 ω1(23) = 7 ω1(123) = 9
so that ψ(ω0) = (2,2,2) and ψ(ω1) = (1,1,7).
The game g is
g(1) = 1 g(12) = 4
g(2) = 1 g(13) = 8
g(3) = 2 g(23) = 8 g(123) = 9.
It has an empty core and the unique aspiration in the ABS is (2,2,6).
The equilibrium outcomes are
Payoffs Partitions
π = (2,2,2) P = {(12),(3)}
ˆ π = (1,2,6) ˆ P = {(1),(23)}
˜ π = (2,1,6) ˜ P = {(13),(2)}
18where (π,P) is ineﬃcient. Even though no interest group is “less productive”,
by being relatively worse oﬀ groups 1 and 2 are taxed more heavily by 3 in case the
reform is passed. Under the disposable endowment rule the threat of a worse political
position drives the ineﬃcient allocation.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results characterize the class of games of policy choice that allow ineﬃcient
outcomes. Although some of the outcomes of these games do have eﬃcient outcomes,
they still are not necessarily Pareto superior to the status quo. In Example 1, the
player left out of the winning coalition is worse oﬀ even in the eﬃcient outcomes.
The disposable endowment rule proposed in section 3 sheds some light on what
the policy suggestions might be for a developing country. Changes in the taxes and
subsidies may alter the nature of the disposable endowments such that, for the same
endowment proﬁle, a game with a revised disposable endowment structure has a
non-empty core.
The structure of the disposable endowment rule determines the degree to which
interest groups in the economy internalize the costs and beneﬁts of the decisions they
support. Of course, the disposable endowment rule is the result of a previous stage of
a similar kind of game in which the choice was the disposable endowment rule itself.
The political feasibility of changing the disposable endowment rule is, however, an
empirical matter.
19The theory presented here is a possible solution to the unanswered question of
what to expect when, in situations of political negotiation, the induced cooperative
games have empty cores and there is no a priori coalition structure. Real life situations
like trade reform, antitrust legislation and others can be studied with this model.
APPENDIX A







































i/ ∈S ψi(ω1) >
 
i/ ∈S ψi(ω0).







1. ω0(N \ S) <     ω0(N); and





For 1. suppose not, then ω0(N \ S) ≥     ω0(N) and
ω0(S) + ω0(N \ S) ≥ 2       ω0(N) > ω0(N) (4)
holds for all   ∈ (1
2,1) which contradicts the superadditivity of ω0. 2. follows immediately.
Lemma 3 Given (ω0,ω1,ψ, ) the associated game v is superadditive.
Proof
Pick any two disjoint coalitions A,B ⊆ N. If A ∪ B is not a winning coalition then





















20so v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
Now suppose that A ∪ B is a winning coalition. By Lemma 2 A and B cannot both be
winners so there are only the following possibilities:
1. Neither A or B are winning. Then






ψi(ω1)} = v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + V (B)






ψi(ω1) and B is
not a winning coalition. Then v(A) =
 
i∈A









































ψi(ω0) ≤ v(A ∪ B)






ψi(ω1) and B is not a winning coalition. Then v(A) =
 






























So the game v is superadditive.
Lemma 4 [Bennett, 1983] For any TU game the aspiration core and the aspiration bar-
gaining set have a non-empty intersection.
Theorem 1 Under the ABS solution, if a game g with n players has an empty core then
it has at least one ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome.
Proof
By Bennett’s theorem the aspiration core is always nonempty. So pick any aspiration
x ∈ AC(v), then
 
i∈N
xi > v(N) (otherwise the core would not be empty). The generating
21collection of any x ∈ GC(x) is a balanced family of coalitions so there exist weights 0 ≤














i∈T ψi(ω1). To see why, suppose not. Then for all coalitions S ∈ GC(x)
it must be true that either v(S) =
 



















Observe that since T gets its maximum payoﬀ it must be that it is a winning coalition
(ω0(T) ≥     ω0(N)).
Therefore for all x ∈ AC(x) there exists a winning coalition Tx ∈ GC(x) such that







By lemma 4, AC(v) ∩ ABS(v)  = ∅ so there is at least one aspiration x ∈ ABS(v) with
a winning coalition T ∈ GC(x) that chooses the status quo.
Theorem 2 If the solution concept is the Partnered Aspiration Core, all the equilibria of a
game g with n players are eﬃcient if and only if the core of g is nonempty.
Proof
The result follows from the deﬁnition of Aspiration Core, Lemma 4 and Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 For three player games g with an empty core there is a unique aspiration
x in ABS(g) with
GC(x) = {(12),(13),(23)}
There are at most three equilibrium outcomes, and at least one of them is ineﬃcient.
Proof
By deﬁnition, all aspirations x must satisfy
 
i∈S







(v(12) + v(13) + v(23)) > v(123) (9)
22Then all x in Asp(v) must satisfy:
v(1) ≤ x1 v(12) ≤ x1 + x2 (10)
v(2) ≤ x2 v(13) ≤ x1 + x3 (11)
v(3) ≤ x3 v(23) ≤ x2 + x3 (12)
v(123) < x1 + x2 + x3 (13)
By the feasibility condition, for all aspirations x and i there is a coalition in GC(v) that
can aﬀord i’s price. Then any aspiration x cannot have xi = v(i) and xj = v(j) for i,j,
i  = j because it would imply xi + xj < v(ij). So at most one player i can have xi = v(i),
with the rest of the players j,k (i  = j  = k) solving the system:
xi + xj = v(ij)
xi + xk = v(ik)
(14)
so the feasibility condition of aspirations is satisﬁed.
For the players i,j,k with i  = j  = k all aspirations are of the form:
v(i) ≤ xi v(ij) = xi + xj (15)
v(j) < xj v(ik)) = xi + xk (16)
v(k) < xk v(jk) ≤ xj + xk (17)
v(ijk) < xi + xj + xk (18)
with either v(i) = xi, v(jk) < xj + xk; v(i) < xi, v(jk) = xj + xk; or, v(i) < xi, v(jk) <
xj + xk.
Finally observe the only aspiration satisfying the partnering condition of the aspiration
bargaining set is the one solving:
x1 + x2 = v(12)
x1 + x3 = v(13)
x2 + x3 = v(23)
(19)
So x ∈ ABS(v).
Proposition 2 Under the ABS solution, if n = 3, all the equilibria of the game g are
eﬃcient if and only if the core of g is non-empty.
23Proof
By Theorem 1 games with empty cores have ineﬃcient outcomes. It is left to show that if
n = 3 games with nonempty cores have no ineﬃcient outcomes.
Suppose to the contrary that there is a game with a non empty core and an ineﬃcient
outcome, there exists an aspiration x ∈ ABS(v) and a (winning) coalition T ⊆ N such that
x(T) = v(T) = ψ0(T) > ψ1(T).
Clearly T  = N. Then it must be that T is a singleton or has two players. Without loss
of generality assume that T = {1}. Then by Lemmas 1 and 2 {23} is a losing coalition and
v(23) = ψ0(23) < ψ1(23). Since x is an aspiration there is at least one coalition supporting
the payoﬀ of each player.
Observe that N / ∈ GC(x). Otherwise to satisfy the partnership condition either (2),
(3) ∈ GC(x) or (23) ∈ GC(x). But then ψ0(1)+ψ0(2)+ψ0(3) = ψ1(123) or ψ0(1)+ψ0(j)+
ψ1(k) = ψ1(123) with 1  = j  = k or ψ0(1) + ψ0(23)+ = ψ1(123) which contradict ω1 ⊲ ω0.
Since N / ∈ GC(x), x(123) > v(123). By a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition
1 it must be that to satisfy the partnership condition the generating collection must be
GC(x) = {(12),(13),(23)}. But then GC(x) is a balanced family with weights wS = 1
2 for









v(23) > v(123) (20)
which contradicts the nonemptiness of the core.
Proposition 3 Let n = 3 and C(v)  = ∅. If ¯ v < v(N) then ABS(v)   C(v) and all
x ∈ ABS(v) have GC(x) = {N}.
Proof
Suppose the game v has a non-empty core, that is ¯ v ≤ v(N). In this case C(v) = AC(v)
and AC(v) ∩ ABS(v) ⊆ C(v). First it is necessary to show that there are no aspirations in
ABS(v) that lie outside the core.
Suppose not, then there is an aspiration x ∈ ABS(v) with
 
ı∈N xi > v(N). Then
GC(x)is a family of coalitions with N / ∈ GC(x) but ∪S∈GC(x)S = N. If GC(x)contains a
partition of N then
 
i∈N xi ≤ ¯ v ≤ v(N), a contradiction. Then GC(x) does not contain a
partition of N. Then since n = 3 and GC(x)satisﬁes the no vulnerability condition it must












v(23) > v(N) (21)
which contradicts the nonemptiness of the core. So ABS(v) ⊆ C(v).
By Theorem B.10 (Reny, Winters and Wooders), x ∈ {ABS(v) ∩ AC(v)} if and only if
x ∈ riC(v) for a game v with a non-empty core and ¯ v < v(N). By deﬁnition a payoﬀ in
riC(v) can only be supported by the grand coalition.
APPENDIX B
Consider a set of players N = {1,...,n}. A coalition is a nonempty set S ⊆ N. The
coalition N is referred to as the grand coalition.
Definition 11 A game with transferable utility (or a game) on a set of players N is a
function:
v : 2N → R
that vanishes on the empty set.
The number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S.
Definition 12 The set of all TU games on a set N of players is: ΓN.
A games is called monotone if for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N it is true that v(S) ≤ v(T). A game
is superadditive if for any disjoint coalitions S,T ⊆ N it is true that v(S∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T).
Let θ : N → N be a permutation and for any game v, deﬁne a new game θ∗v : 2N → R
as
θ∗v(S) = v(θS)
The Shapley value is a function φ : ΓN → Rn such that:
i) φ(αv + βv′) = αφ(v) + βφ(v′) (Linearity)
ii) φ(θ∗v) = θφ(v) (Symmetry)




iv) If φ(v ∪ S) = v(S) ∀S ⊆ 2N \ {∅} then (φv)i = 0. (Null Player)




|S|!(n − |S| − 1)
n!
[v (S ∪ {i} − v(S))] (22)
for all i ∈ N.
Definition 13 The core of a game v (C(v)) is the set of vectors x ∈ RN satisfying
 






The core of a game v is a convex set. This gives the following deﬁnition.
Definition 14 The relative interior of C(v), denoted by riC(v) is deﬁned by:
riC(v) = {x ∈ C(v)|Bδ(x) ∩ ∆n(v(N))   C(v) for some δ > 0}




i∈N xi = v(N)}.
Definition 15 A subset B of 2N is a balanced family of coalitions if there are non-negative










Theorem B.1 [Bondareva and Shapley] Balancedness of a game is a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for its core to be nonempty.
An alternative characterization of games with nonempty cores is due to Zhao (2001).













xi ≥ v(S) ∀S  = N.
(23)
Theorem B.2 [Zhao, 2001]
261. C(v)  = ∅ if and only if v(N) ≥ ¯ v;
2. riC(v)  = ∅ if and only if v(N) > ¯ v.
The following are taken from Bennett 1983, 1984 and Bennett and Zame 1988.
Theorem B.3 [Bennett] For a game v the vector x ∈ Rn is an aspiration if and only if








xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N
(24)






xi for all y ∈ Asp(v).
Theorem B.4 [Cross] The vector x ∈ RN is a balanced aspiration for the game v if and








xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N
(25)
Definition 19 The Aspiration Core AC(v) of a game is the set of all balanced aspirations.
Theorem B.5 [Bennett] The Aspiration Core is nonempty.
Theorem B.6 [Bennett] The generating collection GC(x) of the aspiration x is a balanced
family of coalitions if and only if x ∈ AC(v).
Definition 20 Let GCi(x) = {S ∈ GC(x)|i ∈ S}. Then i is vulnerable to j at x if
GCi(x)   GCj(x)
Definition 21 The Aspiration Bargaining Set (ABS(v)) is the set of aspirations x in
which no player is vulnerable.
Theorem B.7 [Bennett] The Aspiration Bargaining Set is nonempty.
Theorem B.8 [Reny, Winters and Wooders (1993)]
If v is a quasi-strictly convex game then x ∈ ABS(v) if and only if x ∈ riC(v).
Theorem B.9 [Reny, Winters and Wooders (1993)]
If v is a game with three players and C(v)  = ∅ then x ∈ C(v) is in ABS(v) if and only
if x ∈ riC(v).
27REFERENCES
[1] Aivazian, V.A., and J. L. Callen (1981): “The Coase Theorem and the
Empty Core,” Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 175-181.
[2] Aivazian, V.A., J. L. Callen and I. Lipnowski (1987): “The Coase The-
orem and Coalitional Stability,” Economica, 54, 517-520.
[3] Aumann, R.J. and M. Kurz (1977): “Power and Taxes,” Econometrica, 45,
1137-1161.
[4] Aumann, R.J. and M. Maschler (1997): “The Bargaining Set for Coop-
erative Games,” in Classics in Game Theory, ed. by H.W. Kuhn. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 140-169.
[5] Bennett, E. (1983): “The Aspiration Approach to Predicting Coalition For-
mation and Payoﬀ Distribution in Sidepayment Games,” International Journal
of Game Theory, 12, 1-28.
[6] ———– (1984): “A New Approach to Predicting Coalition Formation and Payoﬀ
Distribution in Characteristic Function Games,” in Coalitions and Collective
Action, ed. by M.J. Holler. Wuerzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 60-80.
[7] ———– (1985): “Endogenous vs. Exogenous Coalition Formation,” Economie
appliqu´ ee, XXXVII, 611-635.
28[8] Bennett, E. and W. Zame (1988):“Bargaining in Cooperative Games”, In-
ternational Journal of Game Theory, 17, 279-300.
[9] Besley, T. and S. Coate (1998): “Sources of Ineﬃciency in a Representative
Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis”, American Economic Review, 88, 139-156.
[10] Eggertsson, T. (1990): Economic behavior and institutions. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
[11] Luce, D. and H. Raiffa (1957): Games and Decisions. New York: Dover.
[12] Moldovanu, B. (1997): “Are Stable Demand Vectors in the Core of Two-
Sided Markets? Some Graph Theoretical Considerations,” in Understanding
strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, ed. by W. Albers et
al. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, 270-278.
[13] Reny, P., E. Winters and M. Wooders (1993): “The Partnered Core of a
Game with Side Payments,” Research Report 9317, Department of Economics,
University of Western Ontario.
[14] Rodrik, D. (1993): “The Positive Economics of Policy Reform,” American
Economic Review, 83, 356-361.
[15] Shubik, M. (1984): A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
29[16] Vega-Redondo, F. (1990): “Technological Change and Institutional Inertia:
A Co-Evolutionary Model with two Hierarchical Levels,” Working Paper, Uni-
versitat Aut` onoma de Barcelona.
[17] ———– (1993): “Technological Change and Institutional Inertia: a Game The-
oretic Approach,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3, 199-224.
[18] Zhao, J. ”The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core”, Economic
Theory, 18, 635-648.
30